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HONORS THESIS ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to identify the extent to which firm s in the services industries
manage earnings by selling fixed assets and long-held investments. My design
utilizes two regression equations: the first is to estimate normal levels o f gains on
asset sales and the second is to determ ine w hether abnormally high gains on
asset sales are associated with firm s that have an incentive to manage earnings.
Such firm s are identified by ju st beating one of two benchmarks: zero earnings or
last year’s earnings. My results imply that there is no significant correlation
between firm s with an incentive to manage earnings and abnorm ally high gains
on asset sales, which is consistent with prior literature.

Managing Earnings through the Sale of Assets

Introduction
Many topics in financial accounting are black and white: there is little room for
interpretation. Accounting standards in the United States are established by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and these standards are often described as “rulesbased,” supporting the notion that the FASB tries to leave very little grey area in their
standards so that companies are as uniform in their reporting as possible. Comparability
in accounting helps financial statement users (such as investors and creditors) identify
similarities and differences between companies, and helps ensure efficient allocation o f
capital in financial markets.
Despite these rules-based accounting standards, there is still a role for judgment
and estimation in accounting. The manipulation o f financial accounting reports is often
referred to as earnings management, and it is one o f a few areas in financial accounting
which fascinate me. The line between managing earnings and intentionally misstating
financial statements is blurry, and the ethical and legal aspects o f earnings management
are just as unclear. I enjoy exploring and investigating ambiguous subjects, so a research
project examining earnings management suits me well.
My research goal is to discover how prevalent earnings management is in
business. It would be difficult to generalize about all companies using every earnings
management technique, so in my study, I will narrow my focus to detecting only one
technique o f earnings management in one group o f industries. Research on earnings
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management is very important. Accounting standard-setters and legislators need to know
the extent to which managers manage earnings so that they can decide whether to enact
laws or regulations against such behavior. It is my hope that my paper will reinforce the
importance o f this issue and will add new insights to the extant literature on this topic.
L iteratu re Review
Earnings management is a very controversial issue in financial reporting in which
managers intentionally manipulate earnings numbers either to help smooth income
(reduce volatility in reported earnings) or to maximize reported earnings. Managers have
an incentive to report the best earnings numbers possible to increase bonuses and raise
the company’s stock price, which, in turn, increases the value o f the managers’ stock
options. One o f the reasons that earnings management is such a contentious issue is that it
is difficult to detect.
Managers can manage earnings using a variety o f methods, usually categorized as
either manipulation o f accruals or real earnings management. Manipulation o f accruals
occurs when managers alter their estimates o f accrual accounts, which can affect net
income.1 Managers engage in real earnings management when they make operating
decisions, such as selling assets or producing more inventory, to improve the company’s
earnings. Since real earnings management involves operating decisions, as opposed to
changes in estimates, it is generally much more difficult to detect, as there is a possibility
the operating decisions were made for legitimate business purposes.
Earnings management has been a popular subject o f research for the past few
decades. Schipper (1989) reviews much o f the literature up to the point o f her publication
'Some financial transactions are recorded at estimated amounts, and those are called accruals. Some accrual accounts (such as
allowance for doubtful accounts) also affect expense accounts, which changes net income. Many o f these accruals require judgments,
which allow for managers to manipulate earnings by either overestimating or underestimating them.
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and provides some o f her own insights on the subject, focusing mainly on the
manipulation o f accruals. She finds that, up to that point, most research consisted o f
creating models that predicted normal levels o f accruals, then identifying companies
whose accruals appeared to be abnormal. Baber et al. (1991) focus more on real earnings
management through discretionary spending on research and development (R&D). R&D
expenditures have been a particularly common area o f study in earnings management,
probably because they must be separately disclosed, rather than grouped into selling,
general and administrative (SG&A) expense. Roychowdhury (2006) discovers that firms
with earnings just above zero use many other real methods to manage earnings, including
price discounts and sales promotions (to drive sales) and overproduction (to lower cost o f
goods sold).
Bartov (1993) finds that managers tend to time sales o f fixed assets and
investments to help either smooth earnings or meet debt covenants. Hermann et al. (2002)
research management behavior in Japan and also find that managers sell fixed assets and
securities in order to manage earnings. The benchmark for Hermann et al. (2002) was an
internal forecast developed by management.
Graham et al. (2005) survey 401 financial executives about financial reporting
and how it affects their decisions. Evidence from the survey indicates that 78% o f
financial executives would sacrifice economic value in order to meet earnings
benchmarks or smooth earnings. Graham et al. (2005) find that, generally, executives are
chiefly concerned with the company’s reputation and stock price (as well as their own
careers), so they are willing to sacrifice economic value and/or negatively affect cash
flow. Another notable discovery from their research is that the surveyed executives prefer
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to use real earnings management techniques over accounting-based techniques (i.e.,
manipulation o f accruals).
Bennet and Bradbury (2010) find evidence o f earnings management through
greater sales and reduced inventory, which are real activities, but did not detect any
manipulation o f accruals. Gunny (2010) also finds evidence o f real earnings
management. According to her research, there is a positive correlation between meeting
or just beating earnings benchmarks (i.e., zero earnings or last year’s earnings) and the
use o f real earnings management. W hat’s more, Gunny (2010) discovers that companies
that use real earnings management to meet benchmarks have better subsequent
performance than companies that do not use earnings management and just miss out on
earnings benchmarks. This confirms that there are real benefits to using real earnings
management. She concludes that one reason for the better performance is due to
signaling, or the notion that companies manage their earnings to try to show the true
underlying value o f the firm. This suggests that earnings management can be a positive
tool used to report even more accurate information about companies. That, however, is
not supported by the observations o f Graham et al. (2005), who report that managers
willingly sacrifice the economic value o f their firms to manage earnings.
Eldenburg et al. (2011) find evidence o f real earnings management in non-profit
hospitals. These hospitals have the incentive to positively manage earnings to report
positive income but also to manage earnings negatively to avoid excessive earnings and
thereby giving the impression that they are not using all o f their resources effectively.
Eldenburg et al. (2011) determine that to meet/beat the benchmark o f zero earnings,
managers cut expenditures from non-operating and non-revenue-generating activities. To
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cut back earnings, however, managers tend to dispose o f fixed assets, generating losses
and decreasing net income.
Cohen et al. (2008) determine that before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) went
into effect in 2002, companies were much more prone to engage in earnings management
through manipulation o f accruals. After SOX went into effect, however, companies
quickly switched to real earnings management techniques, which are more difficult to
detect than manipulating accruals, to disguise their actions to avoid reprimand. CEOs and
CFOs switched to the less risky real earnings management because, once SOX was
enacted, the individuals in both o f these positions became personally responsible for
certifying the accuracy and completeness o f the company’s financial statements. Hunton
et al.’s (2006) findings mirror those o f Cohen et al. (2008). Hunton et al. (2006) find that
managers are less likely to manage earnings in areas with greater transparency, so they
alter their techniques to exploit areas that are less visible to both the public and
regulators. Hirst and Hopkins (1998) conduct a similar study, focusing more on analysts’
behavior rather than management’s. This type o f research is important because it helps us
understand how earnings management affects analysts’ opinions and how they value
companies’ stock.
Hirst and Hopkins (1998) try to determine, based on two different methods o f
disclosure, how analysts respond to the sale o f available-for-sale securities for the
purpose of managing earnings upwards. They ask four groups o f buy-side equity analysts
to value a company’s stock price after they present a different set o f financial statements
to each group. The first group is given financial statements that contain no earnings
management with comprehensive income (Cl) reported in the income statement while the
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second group has financial statements that do include earnings management with Cl
disclosed the same way. The last two groups have financial statements with Cl included
in the statement o f stockholders’ equity, however one set contains earnings management
while the other does not.
Hirst and Hopkins (1998) find that Cl disclosure in the income statement leads to
similar stock price valuations, regardless o f whether there was earnings management.
However, in the statement o f stockholders’ equity disclosure, analysts give a higher stock
price to the financial statements that included earnings management. Hirst and Hopkins
(1998) conclude that this occurs because analysts are more likely to consider the earnings
management if it is transparently reported on a statement o f performance (i.e., the income
statement), and will factor it out o f their valuation. However, they are less likely to detect
the earnings management if Cl is presented on the statement o f stockholders’ equity.
Since GAAP currently allows reporting entities to include Cl on the statement o f
stockholders’ equity (and most elect to), there is an increased chance o f earnings
management through the sale o f available-for-sale securities.2
Hypothesis Development
I derive my hypothesis from Gunny’s (2010) study on how real earnings
management is associated with future performance. Unlike Gunny, though, I do not
hypothesize on how earnings management and future performance are related. Instead, I
focus on uncovering evidence o f earnings management through the use o f real activities,
specifically the sale o f assets. I narrow the focus o f my hypothesis even more by only
considering firms in the services industries. I then target firms with an incentive to
manage earnings, just as Gunny (2010) did, by distinguishing firms that just meet two
2Due to an Accounting Standard Update in 2011, the method o f reporting comprehensive income in the statement o f stockholders’
equity will no longer be allowed. This could have implications for earnings management, making it more difficult.
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particular benchmarks. These two benchmarks are zero earnings and last year’s earnings,
the same two used in Gunny’s (2010) study. I use these two benchmarks because I want
to maintain comparability to Gunny’s (2010) study and also because they are easy to
determine. Although Gunny (2010) did not find any evidence o f real earnings
management through asset sales, I believe that I will find such evidence with my more
exclusive sample, which leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Firms that just meet either zero earnings or last yea r’s

earnings display signs o f earnings management through abnormal
gains and losses on the sale o f assets.
Research Design
The sample was derived from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), through
its COMPUSTAT North America database, and consists o f all firms in the services
industries (SIC codes 7000-8999). I included annual data for firms spanning from 1988
through 2006 (19 years). I limited my sample to pre-2007 data so that none o f the effects
o f the late-2000s recession would be included in my dataset. Also, consistent with Gunny
(2010), I began with year 1988 because that was the first year that COMPUSTAT had
data on income from asset sales. The sample contains 25,547 observations and 3,706
firms.
The design I use is taken directly from Gunny (2010). I use her design because it
is well-structured, yet it did not uncover any evidence o f earnings management through
asset sales. This may be due to the fact that her sample included all industries (except the
financial and utilities industries), so I targeted firms in the services industries since asset
sales behavior is probably more consistent in similar industries and will therefore lead to
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a more reliable regression analysis. I chose to target services industries because, after
analyzing the asset sales behavior o f many different industries, I found that firms in the
services industries tend to sell more assets than any other industry - besides the financial
industry - and I believe that the more asset sales data there is, the stronger the results o f
the analysis will be. I chose not to target the financial industry because, as Gunny (2010)
explains, that industry is heavily regulated and would need a much different research
design tailored to it.
This design calls for two separate regression analyses: the first regression will
determine the expected level o f gains on asset sales and the second will determine if there
is an association between firms having an incentive to manage earnings and abnormally
high gains on asset sales measured as the residuals from the first regression (Gunny
2010).

GainAt
*-■=
fit-1

1
_
^
„ INTt „ ASalest „ lSalest
,
Asset
+ «1 -T— + /?!MVt + f}2Qt + 0 3 - j - f + /?4- j — + p s - T - + e?
A t-1

^ t-1

H t- 1

fit-1

GainA

= income from asset sales

A

=

total assets

MV

=

the natural logarithm o f market value

Q

=

Tobin’s Q, calculated as (market value + preferred stock + long- and short
term debt) / lagged total assets

INT

=

internal funds, calculated as (income before extraordinary items +
depreciation and amortization + research and development expense)

ASales

=

long-lived asset sales

JSales

=

long-lived investment sales
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All o f the variables in Gunny’s (2010) design are considered to be significant in
determining a firm’s level o f gains on asset sales. Market value is included in the formula
to control for size effects. Internal funds is another control variable which represent
reduced funds available for investment. Tobin’s Q indicates the marginal benefit to the
marginal cost o f adding a new unit o f investment, which has a large bearing on whether a
firm will sell long-lived assets (Gunny 2010).
For this design to function properly, income from asset sales, long-lived asset
sales and long-lived investment sales must be monotonic, meaning they must all enter the
equation with the same sign (positive or negative). Since it is possible for firms to have
negative income from asset sales but impossible to have negative sales on assets, I
converted all asset and investment sales to negative for observations where the income
from asset sales was negative. Accordingly, the coefficients on the asset and investment
sales variables are expected to be positive. High residuals from this equation are a signal
o f abnormal gains or losses through asset sales, which may be the result o f earnings
management (Gunny 2010).
For this analysis to be successful, it is necessary to separate firms that have an
incentive to manage earnings with those who do not. To accomplish this, I employ the
same technique Gunny (2010) uses to distinguish the firms. I use two different
benchmarks to indicate an incentive to manage earnings: (1) net income just above $0
and (2) net income just above last year’s earnings. To determine which firms just beat $0
earnings, I divide net income by total assets from the beginning o f the year, and any firm
with a result between zero and 0.01 is classified as BENCH (a firm which has an
incentive to manage earnings). For the second benchmark, I subtract last year’s net
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income from this year’s, and then divide the result by total assets at the beginning o f the
year. As with the previous benchmark, any firm with a result between zero and 0.01 is
labeled BENCH.
<Insert Table 1 here>

Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the estimated levels o f gain on asset sales. The entire sample was
run through the regression equation from the previous section in SPSS v l9 . Unlike
Gunny (2010), I have not winsorized the results at all so that all observations were
included in the analysis. Except for the natural logarithm o f market value (MV), each o f
the coefficients is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In Gunny’s (2010) study, M V
was also not statistically significant. This independent variable was included to control
for size effects, so it appears that this control may not be necessary. The coefficients in
Table 1 for ASales and ISales are both significantly greater than the corresponding
coefficients in Gunny’s (2010) study, which could be due to the fact that there are greater
sales o f assets and investments in the services industries than there are on average. Also,
both coefficients in this study are significant, whereas only ASales in Gunny’s (2010)
research was significant. The statistical significance o f both coefficients could be
explained by the fact that firms in the services industries have more similar asset sales
behavior than do firms across all industries. Another factor that supports similar industry
behavior is the adjusted R 2 in this study o f 0.81, which is significantly higher than
Gunny’s (2010) adjusted R2 o f 0.28.
<Insert Table 2 here>
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Table 2 presents statistics related to the residuals from the first regression. I
chose not to winsorize these results either, so that all observations would be included in
the analysis. The standard deviation for the residuals in my model is much higher than it
is in Gunny’s (2010) study, which suggests that there is much more variety in the
residuals o f this study than in hers.
<Insert Table 3 here>
Table 3 shows Pearson correlations between the residuals and other
characteristics from the firms. The only significant correlation for Abnormal GainAsset is
with MTB, which is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. In Gunny’s (2010) study, no
variables had any statistically significant correlation with the residuals.
Results
I use the same equation as Gunny (2010) to determine the association between
firms just meeting earnings benchmarks (zero earnings, last year’s earnings) and
engaging in earnings management:

Abnorm al GainAssett = y0 + Y\BENCHt + YzSIZEt + y3M7T?t +
BENCH =

+ et

an indicator variable that equals one if (1) net income divided by total assets
at the beginning o f the year is between zero and 0.01 or (2) the change in net
income divided by total assets at the beginning o f the year is between zero
and 0.01; otherwise, the variable equals zero

SIZE

=

the natural logarithm o f total assets

MTB

=

market to book: the market value o f equity divided by the book value o f
equity
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ROA

=

income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the beginning o f
the year

In this second regression equation, the residuals from the first regression enter this
one as the dependent variable. Gunny (2010) multiplied Abnormal GainAsset by (-1) so
that low values would represent earnings management, but I do not do this. So, in this
equation, high values are consistent with earnings management, and the predicted
coefficient on BENCH is positive. SIZE is a control variable for size effects while MTB
controls for opportunities to grow. ROA controls for the concern that earnings
management is correlated to performance (Gunny 2010).
<Insert Table 4 here>
Table 4 displays the results from the second regression analysis. Consistent with
Gunny’s (2010) findings, the BENCH coefficient is close to zero and is not statistically
significant. This indicates that, for the services industries, there is no association between
companies that barely beat earnings benchmarks and abnormally high gains on asset
sales, which refutes my hypothesis.
<Insert Table 5 here>
Table 5 shows the percentage o f BENCH firms by industry (SIC code). In the
services industries overall, 9.31% o f firms just beat earnings benchmarks. When looking
at individual industries, the percentage ranges from 0.00% to 28.01%. According to the
hypothesis, industries with a higher percentage o f BENCH firms should engage in more
earnings management. With that in mind, I tried to apply the same regression equations in
this study to industries 75 and 70, but the samples were not large enough to draw
significant results.
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Sum m ary and Conclusions
This paper contributes to the body o f literature on the identification o f earnings
management. I focus on firms engaging in real earnings management through the sale o f
fixed assets and long-lived investments. I model my research design after Gunny (2010),
but focus on firms in the services industries. In this design, I estimate the normal levels o f
gains on asset sales for the entire sample and then identify firms with an incentive to
manage earnings {BENCH firms) and evaluate whether these firms are associated with
abnormally high gains on asset sales. Gunny (2010) did not find any significant
correlation between abnormally high gains on asset sales and BENCH firms, and I also
found no such correlation in my study.
I did attempt to apply the same regression analysis to two specific industries that
had a greater proportion o f BENCH firms, but the samples were too small. One possible
opportunity for further study would be to aggregate industries with a high proportion o f

BENCH firms and apply Gunny’s (2010) regression on that sample. Another research
opportunity would be to use a similar design to the one in this paper and apply it to
quarterly financial statements rather than annual ones. This would be beneficial because
firms are probably more likely to manage earnings closer to year-end (fourth quarter), so
it would be easier to identify that behavior when just examining that particular quarter.
One more potential area for study is comprehensive income (Cl) disclosure and how it
affects earnings management. This would build on Hirst and Hopkins’ (1998) study and
would be significant because o f the change in reporting requirements, prohibiting firms
from presenting Cl on the statement o f stockholders’ equity. This would make it more
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difficult for firms to engage in earnings management through the sale o f available-forsale securities.
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Appendix: Personal Reflection
I was excited to begin my Capstone project at the beginning o f the semester. At
the end o f the previous semester, Dr. Matuszewski, my faculty adviser, and I picked out a
topic to research that I was very interested in: earnings management. I was fascinated by
this subject because it has no clear ethical or legal boundaries and it is such a
controversial issue. After we decided on the topic, my mind raced, thinking o f all the
different things I could do. I wanted to create a case study, and then I wanted to generate
a revolutionary piece o f research, and then I wanted to do something else. But whatever
my idea was at the time, I thought in my head that I was going to be trailblazing, doing
something new and inventive that no one had ever seen before. After the first couple o f
meetings with Dr. Matuszewski, I realized I would be doing no such thing.
I was first asked to review the literature that related to my topic, a task that I
found to be tedious and time-consuming. There were many times when I found my mind
trailing off as I was reading the papers. Much o f the subject matter was over my head and
I had to concentrate in order to comprehend a lot o f the writing. Once I reviewed the
literature, I had to fashion my study around the research that I read about. I tweaked my
design a few times and did not actually have my design set until the second half o f the
semester - and I ended up using the same design as one o f the papers I had read. I felt
disappointed that I could not even come up with a design o f my own, but I had severely
underestimated the complexity o f some o f the regression equations in the earnings
management literature. It was not until I was actually inputting the information into SPSS
that I fully realized what the design was supposed to measure. But before I could use
SPSS, I needed to get the data into a usable format.
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This part was difficult because the data I had gotten from the WRDS database did
not include variables for last year’s assets and last year’s net income, two measures I had
to have to run the regression analysis. To get these variables, I had to do some
manipulating in Excel. The strange thing is, I found this part o f the project the most
exciting. Before I tried to create the variables, I would daydream about ways to
manipulate the data and utilize formulas to make my job as easy as possible. Once I
figured out how to create the variables using the least amount o f effort, I felt extremely
satisfied. Then my task was to run the regression and write up my results.
Unfortunately, my results did not come out as I had hypothesized. At this point, I
was disappointed all over again; I stole a research design from someone else and did not
get any significant results. I actually thought for a moment that this was all a waste o f
time. Then I remembered how Dr. Matuszewski would stress to me that the main goal o f
this project was to learn about the research process, and I quickly realized that this was
anything but a waste o f time. The process was, at times, stressful, satisfying and
frustrating, but always challenging and rewarding. I know so much more about research
and have much more o f an appreciation for it now. I was not able to blaze any trails with
my research, or even draw any significant results from it, but at least I learned from it.
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TABLE 1
Estimation o f the normal level o f gain on asset sales

Variable

Coefficient

Intercept

-0.012

0.002

0.002

0.000

MVt

0.000

0.700

Qt

0.000

0.012

0.000

0.002

0.422

0.000

0.306

0.000

1

P ■value

j4 £_ !

IN T t
A t -1
A S a le s t

At-1
I S a le s t

At-1
Adj. R 2
# of
Observations

0.81
25,547

TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics o f residuals

Standard
Mean
Residuals

.000

Median
.0129

Deviation
.35

TABLE 3
Pearson correlation matrix

SIZE

MTB

MTB

.011*

ROA

.033***

.036***

Q

-.035***

-.083***

INT

.033***

.036***

Abnormal

.009

.085***

ROA

Q

INT

-.679***
-.668***
-.008

.000

.000

*/**/*** represent statistical significance at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 levels
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TABLE 4
Regression relating abnormal residuals to firms just meeting benchmarks

Variable

Coefficient

p-vahie

-.006

.187

SIZEt

.001

.223

MTBt

.000

.000

ROAt

.000

.066

BENCHt

.006

.464

Intercept

Adj. R 2
#of
Observations

.007
25,547

TABLE 5
Percentage o f firms that just beat earnings benchmarks by SIC code

SIC Code

xion-BENCH

BENCH

75 (307)

71.99%

28.01%

70 (744)

79.44%

20.56%

72 (356)

80.06%

19.94%

83 (261)

84.67%

15.33%

79(1,637)

86.87%

13.13%

78 (1,026)

89.86%

10.14%

80 (2,546)

90.06%

9.94%

87 (2,631)

90.65%

9.35%

76 (93)

91.40%

8.60%

82 (466)

92.27%

7.73%

73 (15,448)

92.45%

7.55%

81 (23)

95.65%

4.35%

86 (4)

100.00%

0.00%

89(5)

100.00%

0.00%

90.69%

9.31%

Total (25,547)

The numbers in parentheses in the SIC Code column represent the number o f firms under
each SIC code
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